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Abstract
We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns
sequentially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assump-
tions on the decision-maker’s strategy, directing attention toward one item increases its
likelihood of being chosen regardless of its value. This result applies when the decision-
maker can reject all items in favor of an outside option with known value; if no outside
option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation depends on the value of
the item. A similar result applies to manipulation of choices in bandit problems.
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1 Introduction
The struggle for attention is a pervasive phenomenon. Attention-seeking behavior plays
an important role in advertising, finance, industrial organization, psychology, and biology.1
∗We have benefited from discussions with Ian Krajbich, Arina Nikandrova, Marco Ottaviani, Ryan Webb,
Andy Zapechelnyuk, and participants at various seminars and conferences. Pavel Ilinov, Jan Sedek, and Jiaqi
Zou provided excellent research assistance. This work was financially supported by the French National
Research Agency (ANR), “Investissements d’Avenir” (ANR-11-IDEX0003/LabEx Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-
0047) (Gossner), ERC grant 770652 (Steiner), and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada (Stewart).
1See, e.g., Fogg-Meade (1901) for advertising, Lou (2014) for finance, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) for
industrial organization, Orquin and Loose (2013) for psychology, and Dukas (2002) for biology.
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The main message is consistent across fields: drawing attention toward an item increases its
demand.
The existing literature provides two main explanations for how grabbing attention can
increase demand.2 One is that it directly affects preferences. While difficult to disprove,
a theory of changing preferences offers limited predictive power and makes welfare analysis
challenging. The other major explanation is that attention-grabbing behavior itself conveys
information—either directly or through signaling—and thereby changes beliefs. But this
second channel alone does not suffice to explain the empirical evidence. In fact, there is
a sizable body of evidence showing that manipulating attention has a direct influence on
demand even when devoid of information.3
We identify a mechanism through which grabbing attention increases demand without
influencing preferences or changing the information available to the decision-maker. We
consider a decision-maker who learns sequentially about the quality of a number of items
by allocating her attention to one of the items in each period. Paying attention to an item
generates noisy information about its value. Due to cognitive (or other) limitations, the
decision-maker can focus on only one item at a time; while she pays attention to a given
item, her assessment of its value evolves stochastically, while her assessments of the other
items remain the same. In our main model, once her assessment of an item is sufficiently
high (according to an exogenously fixed threshold), she stops and chooses that item, and if
her assessments of all items are sufficiently low, she stops and chooses an outside option.
In the context of consumer marketing, we think of the items as substitutable brands of
a good, and the outside option as the choice not to purchase any item. Starting from a
given strategy governing the decision-maker’s attention, we introduce an attention-grabbing
manipulation that induces the decision-maker to focus more on one “target” item (perhaps
only for a limited time). We show that, under general conditions, such a manipulation
increases demand for the target item.
The decision-maker’s learning is governed by an attention strategy that maps assessments
in any given time period to a (possibly random) item of focus. An attention strategy gener-
ates, for each profile of values of the items, a stochastic process over assessments and items
of attention, and a probability that each item is chosen. We refer to these probabilities
as interim demands for the items. The impact of attention manipulation is captured by
the difference in interim demands under the baseline and manipulated attention strategies;
the baseline strategy is the one the decision-maker employs in the absence of manipulation,
while the manipulated strategy induces the decision-maker to increase her focus on a target
2See Bagwell (2007) for a survey in the context of advertising.
3See, e.g., Chandon et al. (2009), Krajbich and Rangel (2011), or, for a survey, Orquin and Loose (2013).
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item at each profile of assessments and in each period, but agrees with the baseline strategy
conditional on not focusing on the target item.
We show that manipulation of attention increases demand and decreases the time to
decision in favor of the target item (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance). This
increase in demand comes at the expense of each of the other items, for which demand
decreases and the time to decision increases. These results hold for any realization of the
items’ values. In particular, manipulating attention increases demand even if the target item
is worse than the other items and the outside option.
The key to understanding the effect of manipulation is to consider the path of learning for
each possible realization of the sequence of signals for each item. Given such a realization, we
can view an attention strategy as selecting, in each period, an item for which to uncover one
more step along the sequence. The choice of item at the end of the process can be thought of
as resulting from a kind of approval contest: the decision-maker continues to learn until she
approves of one of the items, or until she finds all of them to be unworthy of approval. For a
given realization of the sequences of signals, there may be multiple items the decision-maker
would approve of were she to pay enough attention to them. The choice then comes down
to which of these items she approves of first. Directing attention toward one of these items
accelerates the process of approval for this item while slowing it down for the other items.
Consequently, the likelihood that the target item is chosen increases.
This simple intuition ignores the significant complication that manipulating attention
generally affects future attention choice. It could happen that, for some attention strategies,
temporary manipulation toward a target item leads to a path along which the decision-maker
pays much less attention to the target item afterwards, more than compensating for the direct
effect of increased attention. If there are only two items (not including the outside option),
then this cannot happen: our results hold regardless of the baseline attention strategy.
With more than two items, we require two additional assumptions on the attention strategy.
First, the attention strategy should be stationary: focus in each period must depend only
on the current assessment, not on the current time. The second assumption is a form of
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): conditional on not focusing on the target item
i, the probability of focusing on each other item is independent of the belief about the value
of item i (though it may depend on the beliefs about items other than i). Together, these
two assumptions allow us to consider learning about the target item separately from learning
among the remaining items, effectively reducing the problem to one with two items.
A similar but simpler result applies to manipulation of choices in multi-armed bandit
problems. In this framework, the decision-maker chooses an arm in each period and revises
her assessment of an arm after each time she chooses it. We show that, under general
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conditions, manipulating choice toward a target arm never reduces the number of times it is
chosen up to any period. Even if the manipulation ends after a limited time, the decision-
maker’s subsequent choices never overcome the initial increase in the choice of the target
arm. In particular, introducing one arm before the others cannot lead to a reduction in the
total number of times that arm is chosen up to any given period.
To formalize these intuitions, we rely on a technique known in probability theory as
coupling (as in, e.g., Lindvall, 1992). In short, we construct a joint probability space in
which we fix, for each item, the outcome of the learning process that would arise if the
decision-maker focused only on that item. We refer to a profile of realizations of these
learning processes across items as a draw ; that is, a draw is a state in the joint probability
space. Given any draw, the decision-maker’s strategy determines the realization of the
learning process. The strategy affects only the timing of the process for each item, not
the signal realizations or their ordering. We show that, with this coupling, for every draw,
manipulating attention toward an item both increases demand for that item and decreases
decision time if that item is chosen.
Both stationarity and IIA are needed for our results in the sense that their conclusions do
not hold if we dispense with either assumption; we provide counterexamples in Section 5.1
and Appendix B. Both assumptions, though restrictive, are automatically satisfied if the
attention strategy is optimized given the stopping rules in our main model: we prove that,
for a general class of learning costs, optimal attention strategies have a (stationary) Gittins
index structure as in the theory of multi-armed bandits. It follows that these strategies are
stationary and satisfy IIA.
The presence of an outside option motivates the stopping rule employed by the decision-
maker in our main model as a form of satisficing behavior. Such an outside option appears
naturally in consumer choice as the option not to purchase any item, and in finance as the
option to invest in a risk-free asset. Our stopping rule implicitly assumes that the value
of the outside option is not so low that the decision-maker would reject it in favor of an
item she has not inspected, nor so high that she would choose it in favor of such an item.
If there were no outside option (or the value of the outside option was low), the decision-
maker could choose by a process of elimination rather than approval; that is, she could seek
to eliminate items that she believes to be bad and ultimately choose an item—the last one
remaining—with little knowledge of its value. In this case, manipulating attention toward an
item may increase the chance that it is eliminated before the other items, thereby decreasing
the demand for it. Moreover, in the limit as learning becomes arbitrarily precise, we find
that, for any stationary attention strategy that satisfies IIA, manipulation increases demand
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for the target item if its value is high, and decreases demand if its value is low.4
Our results can operate on a variety of timescales. Over a short time horizon, we envision
a consumer choosing among several brands at the point of purchase. In this case, learning
may consist primarily of introspection about the current desirability of each item, includ-
ing recall of past experience consuming the item. Attention can be manipulated through
placement of products on the shelf or webpage, or through previous exposure to advertising
that increases the likelihood of a particular brand coming to mind (e.g., through the recency
effect). Over a longer time horizon, a decision-maker could be repeatedly choosing among
brands of some item and learning about her taste for each brand through her experience con-
suming it. In this case, manipulation in our model corresponds to any change that boosts
consumption (temporarily or permanently) of a particular brand, such as introductory sale
pricing. Our results also apply to changes in the time at which items are introduced: one
item entering the market before the others is equivalent to manipulation in favor of that
item at the beginning of the process. Clinical trials, which we discuss in Section 6.1, are
another application of our model with a relatively long time horizon.
Our result is robust to many aspects of the learning process. The information structure
for each item is general, allowing for any number of signal realizations and dependence on
the current assessment of the item. The decision-maker need not be Bayesian; we can, for
instance, interpret her assessments as intensities of accumulated neural stimuli in favor of
each item (as, e.g., in Platt and Glimcher, 1999), which can evolve according to an arbitrary
stationary Markov process. We also allow for general attention strategies, whether optimal
with respect to some cost structure or not.
When applied to advertising, our model has distinctive predictions compared to theories
of informative advertising (Stigler, 1961; Telser, 1964), signaling (Nelson, 1974), comple-
mentary advertising (Stigler and Becker, 1977; Becker and Murphy, 1993), and persuasive
advertising (Braithwaite, 1928; Kaldor, 1950). Unlike these theories, manipulation in our
model is not associated with a systematic change in the consumer’s assessments of the values
of the items. Data combining consumers’ choices and beliefs can therefore be used to test
among these theories. For example, Atalay et al. (2012) find experimentally that placement
of a product in the horizontal center of a display is associated with increased likelihood of
choice but not with inferences about the quality of the corresponding brand. They argue that
the effect of horizontal placement is due to greater attention being paid to central items, as in
our model. Our theory also provides novel predictions regarding timing. First, manipulation
reduces the time to choose the target item and increases the time for other items. Second,
4This is reminiscent of the experimental finding in Armel et al. (2008) that manipulating attention tends
to increase the choice probability for “appetitive” items and decrease the probability for “aversive” ones.
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as noted above, earlier introduction of an item is associated with an increase in demand.
Related literature Evidence that increased attention boosts demand comes from several
fields. In marketing, Chandon et al. (2009) show that drawing attention to products—
for instance, with large displays or placement at eye level—increases demand. In finance,
Seasholes and Wu (2007) show that attention-grabbing events about individual stocks in-
crease demand for them. In biology, Yorzinski et al. (2013) study the display strategies
through which peacocks grab and retain the attention of peahens during courtship. In each
of these contexts, the decision-maker has an outside option not to choose any available item;
our results suggest that this is an important feature driving the effect of attention-grabbing
behavior on demand.
Our assumptions on attention allocation are rooted in psychology. Though humans are
able to pay attention to multiple stimuli simultaneously, such division of attention is difficult,
especially when the stimuli are similar to each other (e.g., Spelke, Hirst, and Neisser, 1976).
Psychologists distinguish between exogenous and endogenous attention, where the first is
beyond the decision-maker’s control and is triggered by sudden movements, bright colors
and such, while endogenous attention shifts are controlled by the decision-maker (Mayer
et al., 2004). Manipulation of attention in our model could be exogenous in this sense, while
the baseline attention strategy could be endogenous.
Our model builds on a long tradition in statistics and economic theory originating with
Wald (1945), who proposed a theory of optimal sequential learning about a single binary
state. A growing literature studies optimal sequential learning about several options when
attention must focus on one item at a time (Mandelbaum, Shepp, and Vanderbei, 1990;
Ke, Shen, and Villas-Boas, 2016; Ke and Villas-Boas, 2019; Nikandrova and Pancs, 2018;
Austen-Smith and Martinelli, 2018). The structure of the optimal learning strategy varies
depending on the costs and information structure. Our results on the impact of attention
manipulation are independent of these considerations; however, relative to this literature,
we make simplifying assumptions on the rules that govern termination of learning. In a
different vein, Che and Mierendorff (2019) study sequential allocation of attention between
two Poisson signals about a binary state. In contrast, in our model, the decision-maker
chooses among signals about multiple independent states.
In the drift-diffusion model of Ratcliff (1978), a decision-maker tracks the difference in the
strength of supporting evidence between two actions, making a choice when this difference
becomes sufficiently large.5 Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010) explicitly incorporate atten-
tion choice in this model and introduce an exogenous bias in the accumulated signal toward
5Ratcliff’s model is essentially equivalent to a sequential sampling model along the lines of Wald (1945).
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the item on which the decision-maker is currently focusing. This extended drift-diffusion
model accommodates empirical findings showing that exogenous shifts in attention tend to
bias choice (see, e.g., Armel, Beaumel, and Rangel, 2008; Milosavljevic et al., 2012). The
closest drift-diffusion models to ours are the so-called “race models” in which evidence in
support of distinct alternatives is integrated in separate accumulators, with the choice driven
by whichever accumulator reaches its stopping boundary first; see Bogacz et al. (2006) for
a review. Relative to this literature, whose primary modeling goal is to fit choice data, we
focus on foundations for the mechanism by which attention affects demand.
Optimal sequential learning about several items is related to the theory of multi-armed
bandits (Gittins and Jones, 1974). In addition to applying our main result to bandit prob-
lems, we exploit this connection to show that optimal attention strategies in our model of
one-shot choice satisfy IIA by using the Gittins index characterization.
2 Simplified setting
Before presenting the model in its full generality, we introduce the main ideas in two par-
ticularly simple environments in which temporarily manipulating attention toward an item
increases its demand. These two environments differ in how choices of items relate to learn-
ing, but the mechanism behind the effect of manipulation is the same.
In both environments, a decision-maker (DM) learns sequentially about two items j ∈
{1, 2} with unknown values vj ∈ {−1, 1}. In each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the DM focuses on
an item ιt ∈ {1, 2}. Focusing on an item generates a signal xt about the value of that item
which is independent of the value of the other item. Conditional on the values, signals are
independent across periods. In this section, the signal takes a simple form: for each item,
the possible signal realizations are −1 and 1, and for each value v, the realized signal about
an item of value v is equal to v with probability λ > 1/2; that is, Pr(xt = 1 | vιt = 1) = λ =
Pr(xt = −1 | vιt = −1).
For each j and t, let
pjt =
∑
s<t:ιs=j
log
Pr (xs | vj = 1)
Pr (xs | vi = −1)
= log
(
λ
1− λ
) ∑
s<t:ιs=j
xs. (1)
Thus pjt is the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) comparing v
j = 1 to vj = −1 given the observed
signals about item j up to the beginning of period t. We write pt for the pair (p
1
t , p
2
t ).
Attention allocation is governed by a (pure) attention strategy α : R2 −→ {1, 2} that specifies
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the item of focus ιt = α(pt) for each pair pt of LLRs.
6
2.1 Manipulation of attention
In order to understand how manipulation of attention affects choice, we first examine how
it affects subsequent attention allocation.7 To this end, given a baseline strategy β, we
introduce a manipulated strategy µ constructed from β by making item 1 the item of focus
in the initial period and then returning to β in all subsequent periods. That is, the item of
focus µ(p, t) in period t for LLRs p is given by
µ(p, t) =
1 if t = 0,β(p) if t > 0.
For each t, let kt denote the cumulative focus on item 1 before period t under the baseline
strategy β; that is,
kt = |{s < t : β(ps) = 1}|.
Similarly, let k̂t denote the analogous cumulative focus under the manipulated strategy µ.
While manipulation clearly increases attention to item 1 in the first period, subsequent
allocation of attention could, in principle, more than compensate for this effect and cause
item 1 to eventually receive less attention than it would without manipulation. The fol-
lowing result indicates that this cannot happen: manipulation never decreases the attention
allocated to item 1.
Proposition 1. For each t ≥ 1 and all pairs of values v, k̂t (weakly) first-order stochastically
dominates kt.
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This proposition is a special case of Proposition 3; accordingly, we omit its proof.
To compare the allocation of attention under the two strategies, we “couple” the resulting
processes governing the LLRs; that is, we define them on a common probability space in
a way that enables us to make comparisons realization-by-realization. In this section, we
describe this construction informally; a precise treatment is provided in Section 3.1.
6One could equivalently formulate the model in terms of a Bayesian decision-maker whose attention
strategy is a function of posterior beliefs about the values.
7We do not explicitly model how attention is manipulated. Depending on the context, manipulation
could result from changes in visual salience, in relative inspection costs, or in the position of the items on a
list (as in online search results).
8Recall that a random variable σ (weakly) first-order stochastically dominates another random variable
σ′ if Pr(σ ≤ t) ≤ Pr(σ′ ≤ t) for every t. We henceforth drop the “weakly” qualifier.
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For this construction, fix v, and imagine that there is a large (countably infinite) deck of
cards for each item, with each card showing a signal realization of −1 or 1 (with probabilities
as described above). Beginning with all cards in each deck face down, in each period t, the
baseline attention strategy selects a deck from which to draw the next card according to the
item of focus ιt = β(pt). The DM updates the relevant LLR based on the signal shown on the
card that was drawn. Now consider the effect of manipulation for a given sequence of cards
in each deck, where manipulation induces the first card to come from the deck for item 1.
To avoid trivialities, suppose that, absent manipulation, the DM first draws from deck 2.
Manipulation can have persistent and complicated effects on attention allocation by taking
the DM to different path of LLRs pt. And yet, as Proposition 1 indicates, the subsequent
allocation of attention can never overtake the direct effect of manipulation: the cumulative
attention devoted to the target item can only increase as a result of manipulation.
The key observation is that, once the ordering of the cards is fixed, we only need to
keep track of how many cards the baseline and manipulated strategies draw from each deck,
and can disregard the order in which the decks are chosen. At the end of the first period,
compared to the baseline strategy, the manipulated strategy is further ahead with deck 1
(in the sense that more cards have been drawn from deck 1). Correspondingly, the baseline
strategy is further ahead with deck 2. In each subsequent period, either the manipulated
strategy remains ahead with deck 1 (perhaps pulling even further ahead) and the baseline
strategy remains ahead with deck 2, or the numbers of draws from both decks under the
baseline strategy “meet” the numbers under the manipulated strategy. In the latter case,
LLRs and attention allocation coincide under the two processes following the period in which
they meet. Either way, regardless of the ordering of the cards, for any baseline attention
strategy, and up to any period t, cumulative focus on item 1 is at least as large under the
manipulated strategy as under the baseline strategy, and correspondingly, the cumulative
focus on item 2 is at least as large under the baseline strategy as under the manipulated one.
Our interest in how manipulation affects attention allocation is driven by its consequent
effect on choice. The following two subsections present settings in which increased attention
leads to an unambiguous increase in demand.
2.2 One-shot choice
First, we consider a DM who decides when to stop learning and make a one-shot choice
among the two items j ∈ {1, 2} and an outside option with a known value. We focus on
a simple stopping rule that adapts Simon’s (1955) model of satisficing to allow for gradual
learning and the presence of an outside option. If, at any point in the process, the DM has
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collected enough evidence that one of the items is of high value, she stops and chooses that
item. If, on the other hand, she has collected enough evidence that both items are of low
value, she stops and chooses neither item (i.e., chooses the outside option). Accordingly,
we introduce thresholds p < 0 < p and define stopping regions F j = {p : pj ≥ p} for
j = 1, 2, F oo = {p : pj ≤ p for j = 1, 2} and F = F 1 ∪ F 2 ∪ F oo. Learning stops in period
τ = min{t : pt ∈ F} with the DM choosing item j if pτ ∈ F j and the outside option
if pτ ∈ F oo. (Stopping in F 1, F 2, and F oo are mutually exclusive.) See Figure 1 for an
illustration.9
Let τ j denote the period in which the DM chooses item j; that is, τ j = τ if item j
is chosen and τ j = ∞ otherwise. Note that τ and τ j depend on the attention strategy;
accordingly, we write τ(α) and τ j(α) if the attention strategy α is not otherwise clear from
the context.
The above rules specify, for any given pair of values v, the joint stochastic process of
LLRs and focus of attention (pt, ιt)t; we denote by P
v
α their joint law. For any strategy α
and pair of values v, we let the interim demand for item j,
Dj(v;α) = P vα
(
pτ ∈ F j
)
,
be the probability that the DM stops with the choice of j when the true values are v.
We say that an attention strategy α is non-wasteful if α(p) 6= j whenever p is such that
pj ≤ p and pj′ ≥ p for j′ 6= j. Non-wasteful strategies do not focus on an item that the DM
deems to have low value.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the baseline attention strategy β is non-wasteful. For all pairs
of values v ∈ {0, 1}2, manipulating attention toward item 1 in the first period
1. (weakly) increases the demand for item 1 and decreases the demand for item 2; that is,
D1(v;µ) ≥ D1(v; β)
and D2(v;µ) ≤ D2(v; β),
and
2. accelerates the choice of item 1 and decelerates the choice of item 2; that is, τ 1(β)
9This process is an extension of the sequential probability ratio test of Wald (1945) from two to multiple
hypotheses. It also extends the drift-diffusion model of Ratcliff (1978) to allow for choice among three
options (including the outside option). In a non-Bayesian, prior-free setting, results on optimal stopping for
multiple-hypothesis sequential sampling are scarce, presumably due to the lack of an obvious objective and
the complexity of the problem. An exception is the asymptotic literature originating in Chernoff (1959),
who shows that a simple threshold stopping rule is approximately optimal as the cost of sampling vanishes.
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Figure 1: Left : One possible strategy, together with three possible paths of log-likelihood
ratios. Each dot depicts a pair (p1, p2) that can be reached following some sequence of signals.
The arrows at each dot specify the direction of movement, horizontal or vertical, according
to whether the strategy focuses on item 1 or 2, respectively. The bold dot identifies the
starting point (0, 0). At each step of the learning process, (p1, p2) moves to one of the two
adjacent points in the direction of the arrows. The dashed path terminates with the choice
of item 1, the solid path with the choice of item 2, and the dotted path with the choice of the
outside option. Right : Manipulation of attention toward item 1 in the first period can alter
the entire path and the resulting choice. The dashed path results from the baseline strategy
and the solid path from the manipulated strategy for a given realization of the sequence of
signals for each item (in accordance with the coupling construction described in Section 2.1).
first-order stochastically dominates τ 1(µ) and τ 2(µ) first-order stochastically dominates
τ 2(β).
When an item has low value, the associated likelihood ratio tends to drift downward
whenever the DM focuses on it. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the proposition indicates that
manipulating attention toward an item boosts its demand even in this case.
Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 4 in the next section, and thus we provide
here only an informal sketch of the argument.
Suppose that the baseline strategy leads to the choice of item 1; that is, the LLR for
item 1 reaches p in some period τ before that for item 2 does. Following the decks of cards
analogy described above, consider a fixed realization of the sequence of the cards in the two
decks. Note first that, for this realization, regardless of the attention strategy, the LLR for
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item 1 can never reach p before it reaches p. In particular, under the manipulated strategy,
the outside option is not chosen.
As explained above, compared to the baseline strategy, the manipulated strategy must
be at least as far ahead with deck 1 and no further ahead with deck 2 in each period t < τ .
Thus it must be that under the manipulated strategy, the LLR for item 1 reaches p before
the ratio for item 2 does, and does so no later than period τ . Therefore, the manipulated
strategy also leads to the choice of item 1, with this choice occurring no later than under
the baseline strategy. Since this argument applies for every ordering of the cards in the two
decks, it also holds when averaging across sequences conditional on the items’ values (or, for
that matter, conditional on any other event). The argument for the statements about item 2
is symmetric.
2.3 Repeated choice
We show here that manipulation of attention has an unambiguous effect on choice in bandit
problems that is similar to the one-shot case. Suppose the DM chooses in each period
t = 0, 1, . . . one of two arms j = 1, 2 of fixed types vj ∈ {−1, 1}. For example, the two
arms could represent different brands of a product for which the DM has unit demand in
each period, and vj could represent the DM’s taste for brand j. Experiencing a brand allows
the consumer to learn about her taste for it. The choice of arm ιt in period t results in a
stochastic outcome xt ∈ {−1, 1}, where Pr(xt = 1 | vιt = 1) = λ = Pr(xt = −1 | vιt = −1).
In this case, there is no longer any distinction between attention and choice: the DM learns
about an arm in a given period if and only if that is the arm she chooses.
Suppose the DM employs a strategy β(pt) that depends only on the pair of LLRs. Con-
sider a manipulated strategy µ that chooses arm 1 in the first period and is identical to β
thereafter. It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that, regardless of the realization of
v, up to any given period, the distribution of the number of times arm 1 is chosen under µ
first-order stochastically dominates that under β.
3 Attention and its manipulation
We now extend the setting to allow for more than two items, general signal structures, and
stochastic attention strategies. Each item j ∈ I = {1, . . . , I} has a fixed unknown value
vj ∈ V , where V ⊂ R is finite. As above, we let v = (v1, . . . , vI).
The DM forms an assessment pjt ∈ A about each item j in each period t, where A is a
countable set. For instance, if the set of values V is binary, the assessment pjt could be the
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log-likelihood ratio comparing the probabilities of the realized signals across the two values.
Similarly, for a Bayesian DM, pjt could be the posterior belief about item j (in which case
A ⊂ ∆(V )), or the posterior expected value of item j at the beginning of period t (in which
case A ⊂ R). The model also allows for the case in which an assessment of an item consists
of the sequence of signals received about it.10 Finally, in a neuroeconomic context, pjt could
represent the level of neural activity in an area of the brain that accumulates evidence in
favor of choosing j. We write pt = (p
j
t)j for the profile of assessments in period t.
In each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the DM focuses on a single item. As usual, given any finite set
X, we write ∆(X) for the set of probability distributions over X. A (stochastic) attention
strategy is a function α : AI × N −→ ∆(I) that specifies a probability distribution over
items of focus as a function of the assessments at the beginning of a period together with the
current time. One can think of α(p, t) as a vector (αj(p, t))j, where α
j(p, t) is the probability
with which the DM focuses on item j in period t. An attention strategy is stationary if it
does not depend on time, in which case we simply write α(p) for α(p, t).11 If, for every p
and t, an attention strategy α(p, t) assigns probability one to a single item, then we say that
it is a pure strategy, and abuse notation slightly by writing α(p, t) for the item of focus.
The evolution of assessments as a function of the attention strategy is as follows. The DM
begins with a vector p0 = (p
1
0, . . . , p
I
0). If the assessments at the beginning of period t are pt
and the DM focuses on item j in period t, then the assessment of item j follows a stochastic
transition φj : A× V −→ ∆ (A) that depends on pjt and on vj, while the assessments about
all other items remain unchanged; that is, conditional on pt, pt+1 is a random variable such
that pjt+1 is distributed according to φ
j(pjt , v
j) and pj
′
t+1 = p
j′
t for all j
′ 6= j.By fixing the
DM’s assessment of items she is not currently focusing on, we are implicitly assuming that
she treats information extracted in each period as informative only about the item of current
focus.
An attention strategy α naturally induces, for each v, processes of items of focus (ιt)t and
of assessments (pt)t. The law of ιt conditional on (p0, ι0, . . . ,pt−1, ιt−1,pt) is α(pt, t), and the
assessments pt+1 are drawn as described above, conditional on (p0, ι0, . . . ,pt−1, ιt−1,pt, ιt).
Given any vector of values v, we let P vα denote the joint law of the Markov process (pt, ιt)t.
An attention strategy α satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternative j (IIAj) if, con-
ditional on not focusing on item j, the probabilities of focusing on each item j′ 6= j are
independent of pj. Formally, this is the case when, for every t and p,q such that pj
′
= qj
′
10In each of these cases we implicitly assume that the set of signal realizations is countable, which ensures
that the set of assessments is countable as well.
11Note that when an assessment consists of all past signals about an item, the time t can be retrieved
from the vector of assessments pt and every strategy can be formulated as a stationary strategy.
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for all j′ 6= j and αj(p, t), αj(q, t) 6= 1, we have that for every j′ 6= j,
αj
′
(p, t)
1− αj(p, t)
=
αj
′
(q, t)
1− αj(q, t)
.
We say that α satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if it satisfies IIAj for
all items j. Note that IIA is automatically satisfied if there are only two items. It is also
satisfied whenever there is an index function Gj : A −→ R for each item j such that the
DM allocates attention to the item with highest index when there is one, and randomizes
uniformly in case of ties; Sections 5.2 and 4 present contexts in which such indexes emerge
as a property of optimal strategies. Finally, when the index functions are positive, IIA is
satisfied if the DM allocates attention to each item with probability proportional to its index.
One way in which a strategy could violate IIAj would be for it to focus on the least promising
of the remaining items when pj is the lowest assessment (to check whether j is indeed the
worst), and on the most promising of the remaining items when pj is the highest assessment
(to check whether j is indeed the best).
Given a baseline strategy β, an attention strategy µ is a manipulated strategy with target
item i if
µi(p, t) ≥ βi(p, t) for all p, t, (2)
and, for all items j 6= i and all p and t such that µi(p, t) < 1,
µj(p, t)
1− µi(p, t)
=
βj(p, t)
1− βi(p, t)
. (3)
Together, these two conditions say that the effect of manipulation is to (weakly) increase
attention toward the target item, with no effect on the relative attention devoted to other
items (conditional on not inspecting the target item).
This formulation includes as a special case that manipulation induces the DM to focus
on the target item for a fixed number of periods and then follows the baseline strategy
thereafter. Equivalently, β could be the strategy the DM uses when all items are introduced
simultaneously, while µ is the one she uses if the target item is introduced earlier than the
others. Another special case is that both β and µ are stationary, with µ focusing on the
target item with higher probability than β does at every p (and the two strategies agreeing
conditional on not focusing on the target item). For example, β could be the strategy that
the DM employs in the absence of any campaign to market the target item, while µ is the
strategy that results from such a campaign.
Given an attention strategy α, for each t ≥ 0 and each item j, let k(j, t;α) denote the
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cumulative focus of strategy α on item j before period t; that is,
k(j, t;α) = |{s < t : ιs(α) = j}|.
The following result generalizes Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the baseline strategy β is stationary and satisfies IIAi, and that
µ is a manipulated strategy with target item i. For each t ≥ 1 and each v, k(i, t;µ) first-order
stochastically dominates k(i, t; β), and, for each j 6= i, k(j, t; β) first-order stochastically
dominates k(j, t;µ).
This proposition is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 below, which follows from a
coupling argument that we now describe.
3.1 Coupling construction
We fix the vector of values v and construct a common probability space on which we can
compare the process of beliefs and items of focus (pt(β), ιt(β))t under the baseline attention
strategy β to the process (pt(µ), ιt(µ))t under the manipulated strategy µ. The construction
formalizes the informal exposition in Section 2 based on decks of cards. It relies on a
technique known as “coupling” (see, e.g., Lindvall, 1992): we construct the common space
in such a way that the law of (pt(β), ιt(β))t is P
v
β , while the law of (pt(µ), ιt(µ))t is P
v
µ .
We present here a coupling construction that suffices for pure baseline and manipulated
attention strategies. In Appendix A.1, we extend the construction to stochastic attention
strategies.
The probability space consists of realizations of a learning process π = (πj)Ij=1. The
process π is a family of independent learning processes πj = (πjκ)κ=0,1,... for each item j,
where πj is a Markov process starting at pj0 with transitions φ
j(·, vj). The κ-th term πjκ of
the learning process for item j specifies the assessment of item j after κ periods of focus on
that item. A learning draw is a realization of the learning process π. For pure attention
strategies, we refer to a learning draw simply as a draw ; with stochastic attention strategies,
a draw also specifies the realized items of focus (as described in Appendix A.1).
We now construct, for each pure strategy α ∈ {β, µ}, a realization of the process
(pt(α), ιt(α))t as a function of the learning draw. To do so, we recursively define (pt(α), ιt(α))t
as follows. Set pjt(α) = π
j
k(j,t;α) for every j; i.e., set the assessment of each item j after
k(j, t;α) periods of focus on this item to be the k(j, t;α)-th value of the learning process πj.
Given α, let the focus in period t be ιt(α) = α(pt). By construction, the law of the process
(pt(α), ιt(α))t is P
v
α , as needed.
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Our main technical insight is that, given the coupled probability space, manipulating
focus alters the cumulative attention in an unambiguous direction regardless of how it af-
fects subsequent behavior. Below, we use this insight to derive implications of attention
manipulation for choice.
Theorem 1 (Attention Theorem). In every draw, in every period, and for any stationary
baseline attention strategy that satisfies IIAi, the cumulative focus on the target item i is at
least as large under the manipulated process as under the baseline process, and the cumulative
focus on any other item is at least as large under the baseline process as under the manipulated
process. That is, for every t ≥ 1 and j 6= i,
k(i, t;µ) ≥ k(i, t; β)
and k(j, t; β) ≥ k(j, t;µ).
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix A.1.
Unlike Proposition 3, this result does not describe a property of the baseline and ma-
nipulated processes on their own; it relies on our coupling construction. There are many
other ways to couple the two processes in which the conclusion of this theorem does not
hold, such as the coupling in which the two processes are independent; that is, for alterna-
tive couplings, there can be states of the world in which the inequalities in the theorem are
violated. However, that there exists one coupling for which the result holds is sufficient to
prove Proposition 3.
4 Multi-armed bandits
Theorem 1 applies to bandit problems much more generally than the special case described
in Section 2.3.
In each period t, the DM chooses an item j ∈ I, which, in this subsection, we refer to as
an arm. Each arm j is of a fixed type vj ∈ V . Whenever an arm j is chosen in some period t,
it generates a stochastic outcome according to a discrete distribution that may depend on vj
and the sequence of previous outcomes obtained from arm j, but does not depend on t (or
on the timing of previous choices of arms). For each j and t, the DM forms an index pjt ∈ R
as a function of the sequence of outcomes obtained from arm j in periods 0 through t − 1.
For example, pjt could be a Gittins index.
We define the cumulative demand djt(v;α) to be the number of periods up to t in which
the DM pulls arm j under the strategy α. Let β∗ be the strategy that always chooses the
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arm with the highest index, with ties broken by uniform randomization among the index-
maximizing arms.
Corollary 1. Given the baseline strategy β∗, let µ be a manipulated strategy with target arm i.
Relative to the baseline process, regardless of the profile v of types, manipulation increases
cumulative demand for the target arm i up to any period t and decreases the cumulative
demand for each other arm. That is, dit (v;µ) first-order stochastically dominates d
i
t (v; β
∗),
and djt (v; β
∗) first-order stochastically dominates djt (v;µ) for all v and all j 6= i.
Since β∗ is stationary and satisfies IIA, this result follows immediately from the Attention
Theorem with assessments given by the sequence of outcomes obtained from each arm.
One application of this corollary is to a DM who is choosing an experience good in
each period t that pays a stochastic flow utility which depends on the unknown quality of its
brand. If the DM employs a Gittins index policy (with ties broken uniformly), any marketing
intervention that attracts the DM to a target brand (say, by providing a free sample), weakly
increases the cumulative demand for its target up to any point in time at the expense of the
cumulative demand for each other brand. This result holds regardless of how the change in
her behavior as a result of the intervention affects her subsequent choices.
In a similar vein to multi-armed bandits, the Attention Theorem also applies to models
with many consumers who act sequentially, with each choosing an item based on feedback
from past consumers (for example, in the form of product reviews). In this case, assessments
consist of the history of feedback. Our result implies that manipulation of demand toward
a product (through promotions, shelf placement, etc.) cannot backfire, and can only have a
positive effect on cumulative demand for the target item.
5 Manipulation of one-shot choice
We now extend the example in Section 2.2 to the more general setting of Section 3. For
simplicity, we suppose that assessments are real-valued, that is, A ⊂ R.12 The time at which
the DM stops learning is governed by thresholds pj and pj for each j satisfying pj < pj0 < p
j.
If the DM’s assessment pjt satisfies p
j
t ≤ pj then we say that she rejects item j and similarly,
if pjt ≥ pj then she accepts item j. The DM learns until she accepts an item or rejects all
items (in which case she chooses the outside option). We thus define the stopping region F
according to F =
(⋃
j F
j
)
∪F oo, where F j = {p : pj ≥ pj} and F oo = {p : pj ≤ pj for all j}.
12The results in this section extend to arbitrary countable sets A of assessments together with functions
f j : A −→ R and a stopping rule based on comparing f(pjt ) to thresholds p, p ∈ R in the same way as for p
j
t
in this section. Thus, for example, assessments could be posterior beliefs and f j the function mapping each
belief to the corresponding expected value.
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The DM makes her choice at the stopping time τ = min{t : pt ∈ F}: either pτ ∈ F j for
some j, in which case this j is chosen, or pτ ∈ F oo, in which case the outside option is chosen.
(These cases are all mutually exclusive.) For any j ∈ I ∪ {oo}, let the stopping time τ j for
j be equal to τ if j is chosen and ∞ otherwise. (We allow for the possibility that learning
does not stop, in which case τ = τ j =∞ for all j.)
An attention strategy α is non-wasteful if αj(p, t) = 0 for all p such that pj ≤ pj and
pj
′
> pj
′
for some j′ 6= j. A non-wasteful strategy never focuses on an item that the DM has
rejected.
We define the interim demand for item j ∈ I ∪ {oo} under attention strategy α to be
Dj(v;α) = P vα
(
pτ ∈ F j
)
;
this is the probability, under strategy α, that the DM chooses j when the vector of values
is v.
The following proposition states that manipulation in favor of an item both increases
and accelerates demand for this item, and decreases and decelerates demand for every other
item. The demand for the outside option and the timing of its choice are unaffected by the
manipulation. The result holds regardless of the underlying values: even if the target item
is worse than other items, drawing attention to it is never detrimental to the likelihood that
it is chosen.
Proposition 4. If a baseline attention strategy β is stationary, satisfies IIAi, and is non-
wasteful, then for every v and every non-wasteful manipulated strategy µ with target i,
Di(v;µ) ≥ Di(v; β), (4)
Dj(v;µ) ≤ Dj(v; β) for every j 6= i, (5)
and Doo(v;µ) = Doo(v; β). (6)
Moreover, τ i(β) first-order stochastically dominates τ i(µ), τ j(µ) first-order stochastically
dominates τ j(β) for every j 6= i, and τ oo(β) has the same distribution as τ oo(µ).
While the non-wasteful assumption seems natural for the baseline attention strategy,
in some contexts, it may be possible to manipulate attention toward items the DM would
otherwise reject as being of low value. If the baseline attention strategy is non-wasteful but
the manipulated strategy is not, (4) and (5) continue to hold, though (6) may not; in this
case, manipulation can reduce demand for the outside option in favor of the target item.
This result follows from the same reasoning as that underlying Proposition 4.
To prove Proposition 4, we start by examining the choice of the outside option.
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Lemma 1 (Outside Option Lemma). For any two non-wasteful attention strategies α and
α′ and any learning draw, τ oo(α) = τ oo(α′).
The Outside Option Lemma, whose proof may be found in Appendix A.2, states that
whether and when the outside option is chosen depends only on the learning draw, not on
the attention strategy.13 For the outside option to be chosen, the assessment of each item j
must reach the lower threshold pj before reaching the upper threshold pj. For any fixed draw
and any particular item, the attention strategy affects only the time at which assessments
about that item are attained, not their order. Thus if all items are rejected under a strategy
α, they are also rejected after exactly the same number of inspections of each item under
any other strategy α′.
Proof of Proposition 4. To simplify notation, let pt = pt(β) and p̂t = pt(µ). Equation (6)
follows from the Outside Option Lemma by taking expectations across learning draws. For
inequality (4), it suffices to show that, for any given draw, if the target item i is chosen under
the baseline strategy, then i is also chosen under the manipulated strategy, and is chosen no
later than under the baseline strategy.
To see this, consider any learning draw such that the target item i is chosen in period
τ under the baseline strategy. Then, by the Outside Option Lemma, the outside option is
not chosen under the manipulated strategy since it is not chosen under the baseline strategy.
Suppose for contradiction that j 6= i is chosen at some time τ̂ ≤ τ under the manipulated
strategy. Then p̂jτ̂ ≥ pj. By the Attention Theorem, the cumulative focus on item j under the
baseline strategy is at least as large in each period as that under the manipulated strategy.
Thus, there exists a period t ≤ τ̂ such that pjt = p̂
j
τ̂ ≥ pj, and hence the process under the
baseline strategy stops with the choice of j in period t, which establishes the contradiction
since stopping in F i and F j are mutually exclusive. Therefore, it cannot be that, under the
manipulated strategy, an item j 6= i is chosen at a time τ̂ ≤ τ . By the Attention Theorem,
k(i, t;µ) ≥ k(i, t; β) for all t. Hence, there exists τ̂ ≤ τ such that p̂iτ̂ = piτ ≥ pi (since the
manipulated process does not stop with the choice of j 6= i or the outside option before τ̂).
Thus, the manipulated process stops at time τ̂ ≤ τ with the choice of i, as needed. Again,
(4) follows from taking expectations across learning draws. The proof of (5) is analogous
and is relegated to Appendix A.2.
13When applied to advertising, this result relates to the question of “combativeness” (Bagwell, 2007).
If advertising of a product decreases demand for its substitutes, e.g., as documented for sodas by Gasmi
et al. (1992), then regulation may be justified to mitigate this negative externality. In our model, by the
Outside Option Lemma, advertising is purely combative: the total demand for all items is unaffected by
manipulation.
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5.1 Counterexample: failure of IIA
The conclusions of Proposition 4 do not generally hold if the attention strategy does not
satisfy IIA. In terms of the deck of cards analogy from Section 2.1, the problem with a
failure of IIA is that, for a given draw, it may happen at some point that the number
of cards viewed from the target item’s deck is equal under the two processes, while the
numbers for other decks differ, and consequently the beliefs also differ. In that case, the
baseline process can “overtake” the manipulated process in terms of cumulative focus on the
target item. IIAi ensures that this does not happen: whenever the two processes have the
same cumulative focus on the target item i, they have the same cumulative focus on each
other item.
To illustrate, consider an example with three items having binary values vj ∈ {−1, 1}.
Focusing on item ιt ∈ {1, 2, 3} in period t generates a binary signal xt ∈ {−1, 1} equal to the
true value of ιt with probability λ > 1/2 as in Section 2. The DM is Bayesian with the prior
belief that the items are independent and each has probability 1/2 of being of high value.
The assessment pjt is the posterior belief at the beginning of period t that v
j = 1. Thus, if
the DM has assessment pt and focuses on item j, she updates her belief about j to p
j
t [−]
with probability (1 − λ)vj + λ(1 − vj) and to pjt [+] with probability λvj + (1 − λ)(1 − vj),
where
p[+] =
λp
λp+ (1− λ)(1− p)
and p[−] = (1− λ)p
(1− λ)p+ λ(1− p)
,
(7)
as implied by Bayes’ Law.
The stopping thresholds are p = 1
2
[−][−] and p = 1
2
[+][+] for each item. Let the baseline
strategy β be any stationary pure attention strategy that satisfies
β(p) =

2 if p = p0,
1 if p2 6= p20 and p1 > p,
3 if p 6= p0, p2 = p20, and p3 > p.
Any such strategy violates the IIAi assumption for i = 1 since the allocation of attention
between items 2 and 3 at p−1 = (p20, p
3
0) depends on the belief about item 1.
When following strategy β, the DM first focuses on item 2, and then, from the second
period onwards, focuses on item 1 until p1 reaches p or p. This leads to item 1 being chosen
with ex ante probability 1/2.
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Now consider the manipulated strategy µ obtained by directing attention to item 1 in
the first period and following β thereafter. From the second period onwards, µ focuses on
item 3 until p3 reaches p or p, and thus µ leads to the choice of item 1 only if p3 reaches p
and p1 reaches p. Therefore, the manipulated DM chooses the target item 1 with probability
at most 1/4.
One can similarly construct a counterexample with an attention strategy that satisfies
IIA but is non-stationary; see Appendix B.
5.2 IIA and stationarity
IIA and stationarity are satisfied by many simple strategies, such as the one that always
focuses on the most promising item (i.e., the one with the highest expected value) and
randomizes uniformly in case of a tie. In this section, we provide an argument in support of
the IIA and stationarity assumptions based on optimization of the attention strategy for a
Bayesian DM. Accordingly, we assume that the DM has a prior pj0 ∈ ∆(V ) for each item j,
with the values of the items being independent.
We fix the stopping rule for each item and let the DM control her attention strategy
α. Each period of focus on an item j generates a conditionally independent signal whose
distribution depends on vj. Given this signal, the DM updates her belief about item j
according to the transition rule φj(pjt , v
j) described by Bayes’ Law. Until she stops learning,
the DM pays a uniformly bounded flow cost c (pιtt , ιt) ≥ 0 in each period t; this flow cost
may depend on the item ιt of current focus and on the belief p
ιt
t in the current period. After
she terminates in some period t with an item j or with the outside option, the DM receives
a one-time payoff of E
[
vj | pjt
]
or voo, respectively.
Termination is based on thresholds vj and vj for each item j, with vj < voo < vj. The
DM stops and chooses item j as soon as E
[
vj | pjt
]
≥ vj. She never focuses on an item j if
E
[
vj | pjt
]
≤ vj, and she stops and chooses the outside option as soon as E
[
vj | pjt
]
≤ vj for
all items j. Given these restrictions, the DM chooses a strategy α to maximize the expected
discounted value
U(α) = E
[
δτV j
∗ −
τ∑
t=0
δtc (pιtt , ιt)
]
, (8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, τ is the stopping time, j∗ is the chosen item or the
outside option, and V j
∗
= E
[
vj
∗ | pj∗τ
]
if j∗ is an item and is equal to voo if j∗ is the outside
option. The expectation is with respect to the ex ante law P eaα = Ev P
v
α governing the
evolution of beliefs.
We rely here on the theory of multi-armed bandits to show that a Gittins index strategy
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is optimal: for each item j, there exists a Gittins index function Gj(pjt) that depends only on
the assessment of item j, such that the optimal strategy consists in each period of focusing on
an item with the highest Gittins index. When ties are broken with uniform randomization,
such a strategy satisfies IIA and stationarity.
Proposition 5. There exists a strategy that maximizes the objective (8) and satisfies IIA
and stationarity.
Note that, since this result holds for all fixed stopping thresholds, it also holds if the
threshold values vj and vj are chosen optimally (within the particular family of stopping
rules considered here).
The proof of Proposition 5 is relegated to Appendix A.2. The proof constructs a bandit
problem that is equivalent to the optimization of (8). The main challenge in this construction
is to ensure that optimal choices respect the exogenous stopping rule. For the choice of an
item, the corresponding arm becomes “sticky” once its threshold is reached; the outside
option has no corresponding arm, and instead is captured by all arms incurring a permanent
high cost. This part of the construction is based on the Outside Option Lemma, which states
that whether and when the outside option is chosen is independent of the attention strategy,
and therefore appears as a constant in the objective function.
Our bandit construction applies because the stopping thresholds are restricted to be
independent of the DM’s expectations about the other items; if both the attention strategy
and the stopping region are optimized as in Nikandrova and Pancs (2018) and Ke and
Villas-Boas (2019), then there need not exist an optimal Gittins index strategy and IIA is
not guaranteed if there are more than two items. (As noted above, with only two items,
every strategy trivially satisfies IIA.)
5.3 Example: manipulation of the fastest strategy
To illustrate the quantitative impact of manipulating attention, we consider, in a simple set-
ting along the lines of that in Section 2, the fastest attention strategy for any given stopping
thresholds. This strategy takes a simple form that allows for analytical characterization of
the impact of manipulation.
As in Section 2, the DM chooses among two items with unknown values vj ∈ {−1, 1} and
an outside option of known value. The DM is Bayesian with, for each item j, prior belief
pj0 that v
j = 1; values are independent across items. The assessment of an item j is the
posterior belief pjt . Signals are the same as in Section 2. Thus, if the DM has belief pt at
the beginning of period t and focuses on item j ∈ {1, 2}, she updates her belief about j to
pjt [−] or p
j
t [+] as described by (7).
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For simplicity, assume that the stopping thresholds p and p are the same for the two items,
and that each of these thresholds can be reached exactly through some sequence of signals.
Thus, the belief process for each item takes realizations in the set {p, p[+], . . . , p[−], p}.
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Figure 2: A: the fastest attention strategy α∗. B: the ex ante demand D1ea(p
1, p2) for item 1
as a function of p1. The belief p2 is fixed at 0.7 (solid curve), or 0.3 (dashed curve). The
stopping thresholds are p ≈ .99 and p ≈ .01. The depicted (single-period) manipulation
effect e1 is evaluated for p1 = 0.5, and p2 = .7. The curve for p2 = 0.3 is included for
comparison.
The strategy α∗ depicted in Figure 2A focuses on whichever item the DM views as more
promising. Accordingly, for each item j and j′ 6= j,
α∗j(p) =

1 if pj > pj
′
,
1/2 if pj = pj
′
,
0 otherwise.
(9)
The next result states that α∗ is the fastest attention strategy in this environment. Hence
α∗ is optimal for a DM who, given the stopping region F , minimizes a monotone time cost.14
14Given the stopping rule in this example, minimizing the total expected time cost is equivalent to maxi-
mizing the value U(α) in (8) when c (pιtt , ιt) is constant. This equivalence follows from the commonality of
the thresholds across items together with the Outside Option Lemma.
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To state this formally, define the (ex ante) stochastic stopping time τ ea(α) for strategy α to
be the minimal time t at which pt(α) ∈ F under the ex ante law P eaα = EP vα .
Proposition 6. For any strategy α, τ ea(α) first-order stochastically dominates τ ea(α∗).
As with our main results, the proof of this result in Appendix A.2 makes use of coupling,
although the particular construction is distinct from our main one. A different coupling
construction is necessary because the strategy α∗ is not the fastest one in every learning draw:
there exist draws in which focusing on the more promising item leads to a long sequence of
contradictory signals. To prove Proposition 6, we construct a distinct probability space in
which a learning process generated by any strategy α follows the ex ante law P eaα , and α
∗ is
always at least as fast as any other strategy.
How much does the manipulation of attention affect demand? To quantify the effect,
define the ex ante demand for j by
Djea(p0) = P
ea
α∗
(
pτ ∈ F j
)
= Ep0 D
j(v;α∗).
Thus Djea(p0) is the ex ante probability that a DM with prior belief p0 chooses item j under
the fastest strategy α∗. Given a prior belief p, we define the manipulation effect ei(p) to be
the change in the ex ante demand for i resulting from a single-period manipulation of the
fastest strategy α∗ that targets the item i; that is,
ei(p) = E
[
Di(v;µ)−Di(v, α∗)
]
= EDiea
(
p̃i, p−i
)
−Diea(pi, p−i), (10)
where the first expectation is with respect to v distributed according to the prior p, µ is the
manipulated strategy that focuses on item i in the first period and follows α∗ thereafter, p̃i
is the belief resulting from a single-period update of pi, and the second expectation is over
the possible values pi[+] and pi[−] of p̃i. The magnitude of the effect is therefore determined
by the curvature of Diea(p
i, p−i) with respect to pi around p; see Figure 2B. Note that, by
Proposition 4, ei(p) is nonnegative for all p.
Proposition 7. The manipulation effect ei(p) is
1. positive (i.e., nonzero) whenever manipulation affects attention (i.e. when pi ≤ p−i),
2. decreasing in p−i on {pi[+], . . . , p},
3. increasing in pi on {p, p[+], . . . , p−i[−]}, and
4. nonvanishing as p→ 0 and p→ 1 (in the region where the effect is positive).
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Proposition 7, which is proved in Appendix A.2, implies that manipulation has the
strongest impact when it targets an item with a small a priori disadvantage relative to
the other item. Equation (18) in the appendix provides an explicit expression for the size of
the manipulation effect.
While the analysis above applies for exogenously fixed stopping beliefs, similar results
hold in a related setting in which the stopping region is chosen optimally when the DM is
patient. Ke and Villas-Boas (2019) examine a continuous-time model with exponential dis-
counting and show that the analogue of the strategy α∗ (together with a stopping region they
characterize) is optimal. Despite the differences between these models, they both converge
to the same demands in the limit as learning becomes arbitrarily precise, i.e., in the limit
as p→ 0 and p→ 1 in our model, and as the discount factor tends to 1 in the model of Ke
and Villas-Boas. Therefore, they both exhibit exactly the same manipulation effect in their
respective limits.
5.4 No outside option: choice by elimination and approval
While our main focus is on choice in the presence of a known outside option, many laboratory
experiments employ a “forced choice” design in which there is no such option and subjects
must eventually choose one of the items. Formally, we model the difference between these
two cases by varying the stopping rule: in the presence of an outside option, the DM chooses
an item only if she is sufficiently convinced that it is good, whereas with no outside option,
she may choose an item simply because she is convinced the others are bad. In this section,
we show that, with no outside option, the direction of the effect of attention manipulation
generally depends on the value of the target item. With binary values and a Bayesian DM, as
stopping thresholds become precise, manipulating attention toward a good item increases its
demand, while manipulating attention toward a bad item has the opposite effect. This result
parallels the experimental findings of Armel et al. (2008) and Milosavljevic et al. (2012), who
manipulate focus in forced-choice problems involving either desirable or aversive items.
In our model of forced choice, the DM selects exactly one item from the set I = {1, . . . , I}.
Each item j has value vj ∈ {−1, 1}. The DM learns about these values using an attention
strategy α, with the signal structure and assessments pjt defined as in Section 2. (In particu-
lar, each pjt is a log-likelihood ratio.) Relative to our main model, the decision process differs
in the stopping rule: here, the DM stops and chooses an item if she is sufficiently certain
either that its value is high, or that the values of all other items are low. More precisely, for
each item j, there are thresholds pj and pj. Letting p = (p1, p1, p2, p2, . . . , pI , pI), the DM
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stops learning and chooses item j whenever p lies in the set
F jno(p) =
{
p : pj ≥ pj or pj′ ≤ pj′ for all j′ 6= j
}
.
Let Fno(p) =
⋃I
j=1 F
j
no(p), and define the stopping time τ(α, p) = min{t : pt(α) ∈ Fno(p)};
to simplify notation, we write τ in place of τ(α, p) when the arguments are clear from the
context. As before, we define the interim demand for item j, D̃j(v;α, p) = P vα (pτ ∈ F jno(p)),
to be the probability that j is chosen conditional on the items’ values.
The next result states that, in the limit as learning becomes perfectly precise, manip-
ulating attention increases demand for a high-value target item and decreases demand for
a low-value target item. This result holds for the same class of attention strategies as in
Proposition 4.15 Its proof may be found in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 8. Let pl be a sequence of thresholds such that p
i
l
→ −∞ and pil → ∞. Let
(βl, µl) be a sequence of baseline and manipulated strategy pairs, each with target item i, such
that, for each l, βl is stationary and satisfies IIAi, and both βl and µl are non-wasteful with
respect to pl. Then,
lim inf
l→∞
(
D̃i (v;µl, pl)− D̃i (v; βl, pl)
)
≥ 0 if vi = 1, (11)
and lim sup
l→∞
(
D̃i (v;µl, pl)− D̃i (v; βl, pl)
)
≤ 0 if vi = −1. (12)
This result demonstrates the importance of the stopping rule in determining the effect of
manipulation. When the stopping rule allows for an item to be chosen because of a negative
signal about a different item, manipulation can, in some cases, reduce demand for the target
item. For example, with two items and no outside option, suppose the thresholds are such
that a single negative signal about either item j is enough for pj to drop below pj. Then, in
any draw that begins with such a signal for each item, the item chosen is whichever one is
not examined in the first period. Therefore, manipulation does not increase demand for the
target item across all draws, thresholds, and attention strategies.
The proof of Proposition 8 (in the appendix) uses the same coupling construction as in
the proof of Proposition 4: the coupling is across learning processes πj that focus exclusively
on items j = 1, . . . , I, respectively. Whenever the learning process for the target item i
reaches its lower threshold pi (before reaching its upper threshold) and the learning process
15Proposition 8 does not generally hold outside of the limit. For a counterexample, consider a binary choice
with a baseline attention strategy that focuses on item 2 whenever it is not excluded by the non-wastefulness
condition. Suppose v1 = −1. Manipulation that induces the DM to focus on item 1 in the first period
and return to the baseline strategy thereafter increases demand for item 1 if there is some chance that the
assessment p1 reaches p1 following a single inspection.
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for at least one other item j 6= i reaches its upper threshold pj, no attention strategy leads
to item i being chosen. Hence choice is manipulable only if (i) the learning process πi for the
target item reaches its upper threshold, or (ii) the learning processes for all items reach their
lower thresholds. As the lower threshold for item i approaches −∞ and its upper threshold
approaches ∞, the probability of event (i) vanishes when the value of i is low and, likewise,
the probability of event (ii) vanishes when its value is high. Finally, the manipulation effect
is nonnegative in all draws in (i), and nonpositive in all draws in (ii).
The presence of an outside option affects demand in two distinct ways: directly, by
allowing the DM not to choose any item, and indirectly, by affecting the stopping rule. It
turns out that the direct channel is irrelevant for the manipulation effect: the difference
between the two settings is driven by the stopping rule.
To disentangle the two effects, consider an alternative model in which there is no outside
option, and the stopping rule is that from our main setting. Thus learning stops with the
choice of item j whenever pτ ∈ F j = {p : pj ≥ pj} for some j, and with an equal probability
of choosing any item whenever pτ ∈ F oo = {p : pj ≤ pj for all j}. The demand for item j is
therefore
Djalt(v;α) = P
v
α
(
pτ ∈ F j
)
+
1
I
P vα (pτ ∈ F oo)
= Dj(v;α) +
1
|I|
Doo(v;α), (13)
where Dj(v;α) is the interim demand for j ∈ I∪{oo} from our main setting with an outside
option. By the Outside Option Lemma, the second summand in (13) is independent of the
attention strategy. It follows that
Djalt(v;µ)−D
j
alt(v; β) = D
j(v;µ)−Dj(v; β),
and thus, for each v, the manipulation effect in this alternative model is the same as in our
main model with an outside option; the presence of the outside option affects the impact of
manipulation only through the stopping region.
A similar argument applies if the threshold for stopping and accepting an item depends
on the assessments of other items. For example, in the Bayesian continuous-time model
analyzed by Ke and Villas-Boas (2019), the threshold for accepting an item is increasing in
the belief about the other item (in the case of two items). At a prior lying just to the right of
the threshold for accepting item 2, manipulating attention toward item 1 can have a negative
effect on demand in draws that initially feature negative information about both items. In
their solution, when the value of the outside option is low, there is a large range of beliefs
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at which an item is chosen immediately when the other is eliminated. For higher values of
the outside option, for many beliefs, when one item is eliminated, the DM continues to learn
about the other one, as in our model.
6 Further applications
6.1 Clinical trials
One setting outside of marketing in which manipulation may be of concern is clinical trials
(Gallo et al., 2006). Adaptive designs, in which the assignment of treatments depends on
their success so far, are becoming increasing popular in phase II clinical trials (Berry, 2006).
In a “drop-the-loser” design, treatments that perform poorly are eliminated before the end
of the trial. Similarly, those that perform well may be approved for phase III before the trial
ends. In keeping with regulatory requirements, success or failure is typically judged based
on a fixed level of statistical significance, as in the fixed thresholds in our model.16
We analyze the effect of manipulation in the administration of treatments in a stylized
model of adaptive clinical trials. A laboratory runs a sequential trial of a finite set I of I
different drugs on at most T patients, where T is predetermined. In each period t = 1, . . . , T ,
a new patient arrives and is administered a drug ιt ∈ I, the effect xt of which is observed.
The distribution of xt depends on the unknown quality of the administered drug and on
random unobservable characteristics of the patient. Starting from an initial score pj0 for each
drug j, the score pιtt ∈ R for drug ιt is updated to pιtt+1 = φ (pιtt , xt) according to a discrete
transition map φ, while the scores of the remaining drugs j 6= ιt are kept unchanged.
The choice of drug to administer to each patient is governed by a baseline strategy
β : RI −→ ∆(I). A drug is dropped from the trial and not administered again once its
score falls below a fixed threshold pi; that is, βj(p, t) = 0 for all p such that pj ≤ pj. A
drug is approved (for production or more advanced testing) once its score exceeds a fixed
threshold pj. Several drugs can be approved. An approved drug is not tested further within
the trial: βj(p, t) = 0 for all p such that pj ≥ pj. The trial terminates at some time τ once
every drug has been either dropped or approved, or all T patients have participated. Let
Dj(v;α) = P vα
(
pjτ (α) ≥ pj
)
be the probability that j is approved under strategy α.
Corollary 2. Suppose the baseline strategy β is stationary and satisfies IIAi, and let µ
be a manipulated strategy with target i. Manipulation weakly increases the probability that
16Adaptive designs of clinical trials are increasingly popular both because of their statistical advantages
and because of ethical concerns related to administration of drugs that, based on evidence accumulated
during the trial, appear to be inferior. Termination rules are often set in accordance with simple statistical
significance cutoffs imposed by regulatory bodies or by academic journals. See Berry (2006) for an overview.
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the target drug is approved and weakly decreases the approval probability of the other drugs:
Di(v;µ) ≥ Di(v; β) and Dj(v; β) ≥ Dj(v;µ) for all j 6= i.
One example of a stationary strategy that satisfies IIA and may be ethically appealing is
the one that always administers the drug having the highest current score (among those that
have not already been approved). A simple form of manipulation consists of administering
the target drug to the first m patients and then continuing with the baseline strategy β.
The result is a corollary of the Attention Theorem. Since, by any period t, the target
drug receives at least as much cumulative attention—i.e., is administered at least as many
times—under the manipulated strategy as under the baseline strategy, it is approved under
µ in any draw in which it is approved under β. Similarly, for any other drug, in any draw for
which it is approved under the manipulated strategy, it is also approved under the baseline
strategy.
6.2 A neuroeconomic model of choice
The fixed thresholds in our one-shot choice model differ from those in the optimal strategy
in Ke and Villas-Boas (2019), which features thresholds for acceptance that are increasing in
the belief about the other item. A related (but distinct) implementation of varying standards
for acceptance appears in neuroscience in the form of so-called “inhibitory links.” Signals
favoring the choice of each option are accumulated in distinct brain areas called “accumu-
lators”; a given option is chosen once the firing rate of its associated accumulator exceeds
a fixed threshold (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). When a stimulus causes the accumulator
associated with one item to increase, the accumulator for the other item is inhibited via the
inhibitory links (see, e.g., Sterling and Laughlin, 2015).
We model the decision process from Shadlen and Newsome (2001) as follows. The DM
chooses one of two items j = 1, 2 with values vj ∈ {−1, 1}. In each period t = 0, 1, . . . ,
she inspects an item, ιt. If the inspected item is good (i.e., v
ιt = 1), then she receives a
stimulus with probability λ > 1/2; if it is bad, she receives a stimulus with probability 1−λ.
Receipt of a stimulus for an item increases the accumulator for that item and inhibits the
accumulator for the other item. More precisely, the value of the accumulator for item j = 1, 2
at the beginning of period t is
pjt =
∑
s<t:ιs=j
xs − χ
∑
s<t:ιs=j′
xs,
where j′ 6= j, xs ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator of whether the DM received a stimulus in period s,
and χ > 0 is a parameter governing the strength of inhibition.
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Inspection is determined by an arbitrary baseline attention strategy β, which is a function
of the pair pt = (p
1
t , p
2
t ). There is a fixed threshold p
j for each j such that the process
terminates with the choice of item j as soon as pjt ≥ pj. (If neither accumulator reaches the
threshold, the DM never makes a choice.) Let F j = {p : pj ≥ pj}, τ = mint{pt ∈ F 1 ∪ F 2},
and Dj(v;α) = P vα (pτ ∈ F j).
Corollary 3. Suppose the baseline strategy β is stationary, and let µ be a manipulated
strategy. Manipulation weakly increases the probability that the target item is chosen and
weakly decreases the probability that the other item is chosen; that is, Di(v;µ) ≥ Di(v; β)
for the target item i, and Dj(v; β) ≥ Dj(v;µ) for j 6= i.
As stated, this model is not a special case of our main model because the assessment
pjt of item j can change when the other item is inspected. However, a simple reformulation
enables us to apply the Attention Theorem (of which it is a corollary). Let qjt =
∑
s<t:ιs=j
xs,
β̃ (q1t , q
2
t ) = β (q
1
t − χq2t , q2t − χq1t ), µ̃ (q1t , q2t ) = µ (q1t − χq2t , q2t − χq1t ), and the stopping region
be F̃ j =
{
q : qjt − χq
−j
t ≥ p
}
for each j. With this reformulation, each assessment qjt depends
only on the stimuli for item j, and the Attention Theorem applies. It follows that the
cumulative attention k(i, t, µ) devoted to the target item i under the manipulated strategy,
µ, is always at least as large as that under the baseline strategy, β, and the opposite is
true for the other item, j. In our coupling construction, in every draw, qit(µ) ≥ qit(β) and
qjt (β) ≥ q
j
t (µ) for each t because, in this model, the assessment of an item is nondecreasing
in the number of periods of focus on that item. Therefore,
pit(µ) = q
i
t(µ)− χq
j
t (µ) ≥ qit(β)− χq
j
t (β) = p
i
t(β)
and
pjt(β) = q
j
t (β)− χqit(β) ≥ q
j
t (µ)− χqit(µ) = p
j
t(µ)
for each t and each draw. The first claim in the corollary now follows: for each draw in
which strategy β terminates with the choice of i, so does strategy µ. The argument for the
second claim is similar.
7 Summary and discussion
We show how manipulating attention toward an item can boost a DM’s demand for it.
Our argument has two key parts. The first is to identify the effect of manipulation on the
cumulative attention paid to an item. While manipulation has the direct effect of increasing
attention to the target item, it also affects attention indirectly through the DM’s subsequent
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choices of which item to focus on. We show that, under general conditions on the DM’s
strategy, this indirect effect never overcomes the direct effect, and therefore manipulation
can only increase the attention paid to its target. The second part of the argument connects
cumulative attention to choice. With repeated choice, such as multi-armed bandits, this
connection is immediate. In one-shot choice, we show that, in the presence of an outside
option, increased attention implies increased demand when the DM chooses according to a
simple satisficing rule.
Our model offers a novel combination of satisficing and gradual learning about the values
of available choices. This combination necessitates some differences compared to standard
models of satisficing behavior. Most notably, with gradual learning, one must take a stand
on whether and when the DM rejects an item and stops learning about it. We assume that
rejection occurs when the assessment falls below a fixed threshold, just as acceptance is
associated with exceeding a fixed threshold.
The positive effect of attention manipulation can break down in one-shot choice if the
DM sometimes chooses by elimination, i.e., as a result of rejecting other items without first
verifying the value of the chosen item. Choice by elimination arises naturally in the absence
of an outside option, or if the DM optimizes her stopping rule instead of satisficing. For
optimal stopping by a Bayesian DM, while we know that our main result does not generally
hold as stated—i.e., for every prior and realized profile of values, and a large class of attention
strategies—identifying the parameters of the model for which it does is an open question.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 3
We consider a baseline strategy β and a manipulated strategy µ in favour of item i.
The main difficulty compared to the construction of the probability space in Section 3.1
is that the strategies β and µ are stochastic instead of deterministic. This requires us to
amend our coupling construction in order to keep track of the realized items of focus. We
thus use the learning process π = (πj)Ij=1 as constructed in Section 3.1, and introduce an
attention process consisting of random variables (ap,t)p,t, (bp−i,t)p−i,t, and (cp,t)p,t, all of
which are independent and are independent of the learning process. The random variable
ap,t takes values in {0, 1} and Pr(ap,t = 1) = µi(p, t). The random variable bp−i,t takes
values in I \ {i}. For a fixed value of p−i, if there exists pi such that βi(pi,p−i) 6= 1, then
the probability that bp−i,t takes the value j 6= i is βj (pi,p−i) /(1− βi (pi,p−i)), where we
note that the particular value of pi in the formula is irrelevant since β satisfies IIAi.17 The
random variable cp,t takes values in {0, 1} and Pr(cp,t = 1) = β
i(p)
µi(p,t)
whenever µi(p, t) > 0
(and is otherwise arbitrary). A realization of the attention process is called an attention
draw. We refer to a pair of learning and attention draws simply as a draw.
For a strategy α = β or µ, we recursively construct the processes (pt(α), ιt(α))t as
functions of the draw. Recall that k(j, t;α) denotes the cumulative focus on item j up to
period t − 1 given by the realizations (ιt(α))1, . . . , ιt(α))t−1). We let pjt(α) = π
j
k(j,t;α) be
the belief about item j after k(j, t;α) inspections. We proceed to construct the focus ιt(α)
whenever pt /∈ F . Given a sequence of assessments and focus items (ps(α), ιs(α))s<t and
any vector p−i of assessments about items j 6= i, we let ν (p−i, t;α) be the total number of
periods before time t with assessments p−i about items j 6= i in which the DM does not
focus on the target item i; that is,
ν(p−i, t;α) = |{s < t : p−is (α) = p−i, ιs(α) 6= i}|.
For the strategy µ, let ιt(µ) = i if apt(µ),t = 1 and ιt(µ) = bp−it (µ),ν(p−it (µ),t;µ)
otherwise. For
the strategy β, let ιt(β) = i if apt(β),tcpt(β),t = 1 and ιt(β) = bp−it (β),ν(p−it (β),t;β)
otherwise.
By construction, conditional on (p0(α), ι0(α), . . . ,pt−1(α), ιt−1(α),pt(α)), ιt(α) is dis-
tributed according to α(pt(α), t). Conditional on (p0(α), ι0(α), . . . ,pt(α), ιt(α)), p
j
t+1(α) =
17The specification of bp−i,t when no such p
i exists is immaterial for our purposes.
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pjt(α) for all j 6= ιt(α), and p
ιt(α)
t+1 (α) is distributed according to φ
ιt(α)
(
p
ιt(α)
t (α), v
ιt(α)
)
. There-
fore, the law of the process (pt(α), ιt(α))t is P
v
α for both α = β, µ, and this is indeed a valid
coupling.
Let k(−i, t;α) = t − k(i, t;α) denote the number of periods of focus on items other
than the target i. To simplify notation, let k(j, t) = k(j, t; β) and k̂(j, t) = k(j, t;µ) for
j ∈ I ∪ {−i}. For any n ≥ 0, let t(n) be the n-th period such that ιt 6= i under the baseline
strategy; that is, t(n) = min{t : k(−i, t) ≥ n} (where potentially t(n) = ∞). Similarly, let
t̂(n) = min{t : k̂(−i, t) ≥ n}. Let (pt, ιt)t = (pt(β), ιt(β))t and (p̂t, ι̂t)t = (pt(µ), ιt(µ))t.
Lemma 2 (Coupling Lemma). The baseline and manipulated processes coincide when re-
stricted to periods of focus on items other than the target, i. That is, for every n such that
t(n), t̂(n) <∞, (
p−it(0), ιt(0), . . . ,p
−i
t(n), ιt(n)
)
=
(
p̂−i
t̂(0)
, ι̂̂t(0), . . . , p̂
−i
t̂(n)
, ι̂̂t(n)
)
.
Proof of the Coupling Lemma. We prove the result by induction. The property holds for
n = 0 since p−it(0) = p̂
−i
t̂(0)
= p−i0 . Assume it holds for n. For item j = ιt(n) = ι̂̂t(n), we have
pjt(n+1) = π
j
k(j,t(n))+1 = π
j
k̂(j,̂t(n))+1
= p̂j
t̂(n+1)
. For items j 6= i, ιt(n) that do not receive attention
in periods t(n) and t̂(n), respectively, we have pjt(n+1) = p
j
t(n) = p̂
j
t(n) = p̂
j
t̂(n+1)
. Thus we have
p−it(n+1) = p̂
−i
t̂(n+1)
.
It remains to show that the items of attention in period t(n+ 1) of the baseline process
and in period t̂(n+1) of the manipulated process coincide. By the definitions of the attention
processes, we have
ιt(n+1) = bp−i
t(n+1)
,ν
(
p−i
t(n+1)
,t(n+1)
) = b
p̂−i
t̂(n+1)
,ν
(
p̂−i
t̂(n+1)
,t(n+1)
) = b
p̂−i
t̂(n+1)
,ν̂
(
p̂−i
t̂(n+1)
,̂t(n+1)
) = ι̂̂t(n+1)
since, by the induction hypothesis, ν(p̂−it(n+1), t(n+ 1)) = ν̂(p̂
−i
t̂(n+1)
, t̂(n+ 1)).
Proof of the Attention Theorem. We prove by induction that k̂(i, t) ≥ k(i, t) and k̂(−i, t) ≤
k(−i, t) for all periods t. This statement obviously holds for period t+ 1 if k̂(i, t) > k(i, t).
Suppose that k(i, t) = k̂(i, t) in period t. By the Coupling Lemma,(
p−it(0), ιt(0) . . . ,p
−i
t(k(−i,t)), ιt(k(−i,t))
)
=
(
p̂−i
t̂(0)
, ι̂̂t(0), . . . , p̂
−i
t̂(k̂(−i,t)), ι̂̂t(k̂(−i,t))
)
.
Therefore, for every j ∈ I, k(j, t) = k̂(j, t), so that the cumulative focus on each item
before time t is the same in the two processes, which implies that pt = p̂t. By the coupling
construction, for each p and t, the baseline process focuses on the target item i at time t
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only if the manipulated process focuses on i at t. Thus, again, the statement holds in period
t+ 1.
Additionally, the Coupling Lemma implies that items j 6= i are explored in the same order
under both processes, which in turn implies that, for every t and every j 6= i, k̂(j, t) ≤ k(j, t),
as needed.
A.2 Proofs for Section 5
The next two proofs use the probability space arising from the coupling construction in
Section A.1.
Proof of the Outside Option Lemma. Fix a learning draw such that τ oo(α) is finite; that is,
strategy α leads to the outside option being chosen. For each item j, let κj = min{κ : πjκ ≤
pj} be the number of steps needed for the learning process πj to reach the threshold pj.
Since α stops with the choice of the outside option once all beliefs reach their respective
lower thresholds, τ oo(α) =
∑
j κ
j, which is independent of α. In particular, the distribution
of τ oo(α), as well as whether the outside option is chosen (i.e., τ oo(α) <∞), are independent
of α, and so is the probability of this event.
Proof of Proposition 4, inequality (5). Consider any draw such that, under the manipulated
process, an item j 6= i is chosen in period τ̂ . Then, by the Outside Option Lemma, the
baseline process does not choose the outside option. Suppose for contradiction that, under
the baseline process, the target item i is chosen in some period τ ≤ τ̂ . Then piτ ≥ pi. By
the Attention Theorem, there exists a period t ≤ τ such p̂it = piτ ≥ pi and hence under
the manipulated process, i is chosen in period t ≤ τ̂ , which establishes the contradiction.
Therefore, it cannot be that, under the baseline process, i or the outside option is chosen
at a time τ ≤ τ̂ . By the Attention Theorem, k(−i, t) ≥ k̂(−i, t) for all t. By the Coupling
Lemma, the beliefs p−i and p̂−i coincide when restricted to the periods of focus on items
−i. Hence, there exists τ ≤ τ̂ such that p−iτ = p̂−iτ̂ , and the baseline process stops in period
τ with the choice of item j, as needed.
Proof of Proposition 5. We construct a bandit problem and apply a result from Tsitsiklis
(1994) showing the existence of an optimal (stationary) Gittins index strategy; with an
appropriate choice of tie-breaking rule, such strategies satisfy IIA. In the model of Tsitsiklis
(1994) (described in the language of our model), when the DM selects an item j = ιt with
belief pjt in period t, she receives a stochastic flow reward R(p
j
t , j) and the selected item
remains active for T j(pjt) periods. In period t + T
j(pjt), the belief about item j transitions
to a new belief pj
t+T j(pjt )
= ψj(pjt) according to some stochastic function ψ
j, while the beliefs
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about all other items remain unchanged (that is, pj
′
t+T j(pjt )
= pj
′
t for all j
′ 6= j). Then, the
DM selects a new item ιt+T j(pjt )
in period t+ T j(pjt), and so on. . . Let tk denote the random
sequence of periods in which the DM selects items: t0 = 0 and tk+1 = tk + T (p
ιtk
tk
) for each
k ≥ 0. The DM’s problem is to maximize the expected discounted total reward:
Γ(α) = E
∞∑
k=0
δtkR
(
p
ιtk
tk
, ιtk
)
. (14)
Let φ̃j
(
pjt+1 | p
j
t
)
denote the ex ante Markov transition probabilities of the DM’s belief
about item j when she focuses on j in period t, and define the stochastic transition function
ψj by Pr
(
ψ(pjt) = p
)
= φ̃j
(
p | pjt
)
for each p. Fix the reward function to be
R (p, j) =

−c (p, j) if vj < E [vj | pj = ψj(p)] < vj,
−c (p, j) + E [vj | pj = ψj(p)] if E [vj | pj = ψj(p)] ≥ vj,
−c otherwise,
where c is a uniform upper bound on c (pιtt , ιt). If item j is selected in period tk, we set the
activity length T j(pjtk) to be 1 if E
[
vj | pjtk+1
]
< vj and ∞ otherwise.18
This problem differs from the original problem (8) in that the flow payoff from focusing
on item j in period t depends only on pjt and is independent of p
j′
t for j
′ 6= j. The flow
payoffs in the original problem are interdependent because whether the DM stops upon her
expectation of vj reaching vj depends on whether expectations for other items have reached
their respective thresholds. This difference allows us to apply Theorem 2.2 from Tsitsiklis
(1994) (see also Weber, 1992): an optimal solution to the bandit problem (14) is a Gittins
index strategy where the index for an item depends only on the current belief about the item.
In particular, when ties for the highest Gittins index are broken by uniform randomization,
this describes an optimal strategy that satisfies IIA and stationarity.
It remains to connect the bandit problem (14) to the original problem (8). Note that any
optimal strategy in the bandit problem (i) chooses an item j forever once E
[
vj | pjt
]
≥ vj,
and (ii) always chooses an item j such that E
[
vj | pjt
]
> vj provided such an item exists.
Note that Γ(α) = U(α) − cE
∑∞
t=1 1t≥τoo(α), where the expectation is with respect to
τ oo(α). By the Outside Option Lemma, τ oo(α) is identical for all α satisfying (i) and (ii).
Therefore, there exists a constant Kδ such that
Γ(α) = U(α) +Kδ. (15)
18This correlation among the active-period length, reward, and assessment transition complies with Tsit-
siklis’s setting, as he allows for arbitrary correlations among these random variables.
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Thus, a non-wasteful strategy α solves the auxiliary bandit problem (14) if and only if it
solves the original problem (8), as needed.
Proof of Proposition 6. This proof makes use of coupling: we construct a common probabil-
ity space on which we can compare the processes of beliefs pt(α) across attention strategies
α. However, the idea of the proof and the construction of the probability space significantly
differ from that in the proof of Proposition 4.
In this construction, an outcome in the probability space specifies, for every possible
belief, the sequence of belief transitions on any of the items starting at this belief. Let
Π = {p[+], p[+][+], . . . , p[−][−], p[−]} denote the set of beliefs that the DM may attain for
either item. For each π ∈ Π and κ = 0, 1, . . ., let (`(π, κ))π,κ be an i.i.d. family of random
variables with values in {π[+], π[−]} such that the respective probabilities that `(π, κ) takes
each value are π−π[−]
π[+]−π[−] and
π[+]−π
π[+]−π[−] . An element of the probability space, which we refer
to as an updating draw, is a realization of the family of random variables (`(π, κ))π,κ. We
interpret `(π, κ) as the updated belief of a DM who learns for one period about an item
j = 1, 2 starting at the belief pj = π, where κ indicates the total number of times the DM
has focused on an item with associated belief π earlier on.
We now construct, for each fixed updating draw and any attention strategy α, the process
of beliefs pt(α) and verify that they follow the law P
ea
α . Let kt(α) = (k
π
t (α))π∈Π be an
auxiliary counter that takes values in N|Π|. We interpret kπt (α) as the number of times the
belief π has been updated up to period t under strategy α. Define the joint process of the
beliefs pt(α) and the counter kt(α) as follows. Let k
π
0 (α) = 0 for all π and p0(α) = p0. In
each period t, the focus of attention ιt is chosen according to the attention strategy α(pt, t).
Recursively define
kπt+1(α) =
kπt (α) + 1 if π = p
ιt
t ,
kπt (α) otherwise
and
pjt+1(α) =
`
(
π, k
pjt (α)
t (α)
)
if j = ιt,
pjt(α) otherwise.
By construction, for each strategy α, the beliefs pt(α) follow the law P
ea
α .
We make use of an auxiliary process of the beliefs that would result from learning about a
single item in all periods starting from a prior belief π. This process consists of beliefs at(π)
and a counter hπ̃t for each π, π̃ ∈ Π. Formally, let a0(π) = π and hπ̃0 = 0 for all π, π̃ ∈ Π, and
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recursively define at+1(π) = `
(
at(π), h
at(π)
t
)
, and, for each π̃ ∈ Π,
hπ̃t+1 =
hπ̃t + 1 if π̃ = at(π),hπ̃t otherwise.
That is, at(π) is the belief in period t and h
π̃
t counts how many times belief π̃ has been
updated up to period t in this auxiliary process.
It is convenient to reformulate the stopping rule as follows. For each strategy α, let
Mt(α) = maxj=1,2 p
j
t(α), M t(α) = maxs=0,...,tMs(α), and M t(α) = mins=0,...,tMs(α). The
strategy α stops by period t, i.e., τ ea(α) ≤ t, if
p = M t(α) or M t(α) = p.
We now prove that, for every prior, in each updating draw, if a strategy α stops by t,
then the strategy α∗ also stops by t. We proceed by induction on t. First, consider t = 1.
The statement is trivial if p10 = p
2
0; accordingly, assume p
1
0 6= p20. Again, the statement is
trivial if α focuses on the item with the higher belief in period 0; accordingly, assume that α
focuses on the item with the lower belief in period 0. Then M0(α) = M0(α
∗) = max{p10, p20}
and M1(α
∗) = a1 (max{p10, p20}) while M1(α) = max{p10, p20}. Thus
M1(α
∗) ≤M1(α) ≤M1(α) ≤M1(α∗),
as needed.
Suppose the statement holds for t − 1. If α stops by period t then, since the induction
hypothesis applies regardless of the prior, the strategy α̃ stops by t, where α̃(p, 0) = α(p, 0)
and α̃(p, t) = α∗(p) for t > 0. Therefore, to close the induction step, it suffices to prove
that if α̃ stops by t then α∗ stops by t. This is immediate if p10 = p
2
0. Accordingly, suppose
that p10 6= p20 and, without loss of generality, take p10 < p20. If α̃ focuses on item 2 in period
0, then the belief processes are the same under α̃ and α∗. Therefore, let α̃ focus on item 1
in the first period and follow α∗ thereafter.
To compare α̃ and α∗, we distinguish two sets of updating draws. The first set consists of
those for which as(p
2
0) > p
1
0 in every period s = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1. For any (ordered) belief pair
p = (p1, p2), write 〈p〉 for the unordered pair {p1, p2}. (By considering the unordered pairs
of beliefs we eliminate the need to keep track of which item has the higher belief and which
is randomly chosen at a tie.) For each updating draw in this first set, for each s = 1, 2, . . . , t,
〈ps(α∗)〉 =
{
p10, as
(
p20
)}
and Ms(α
∗) = as
(
p20
)
,
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and
〈ps(α̃)〉 =
{
a1
(
p10
)
, as−1
(
p20
)}
and Ms(α̃) = as−1
(
p20
)
since as(p
2
0) > p
1
0 and as(p
2
0) ≥ a1(p10) for all s = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. Therefore, α∗ updates
the belief as(p
2
0) in all periods s = 0, . . . , t, and α̃ updates the belief as−1(p
2
0) in all periods
s = 1, . . . , t. Thus, for each updating draw in this first set,
M t(α
∗) ≤M t(α̃) ≤M t(α̃) ≤M t(α∗),
and the induction step holds.
The second set is the complementary set to the first; that is, it is the set of updating
draws for which there exists a period s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t − 1} in which as(p20) = p10. Let s∗ be
the minimal such period. For each draw in this second set, we have
〈ps∗+1(α∗)〉 =
{
p10, a1(p
1
0)
}
since 〈ps∗(α∗)〉 = {p10, p10} and the belief p10 is updated once by s∗ under the strategy α∗. We
also have
〈ps∗+1(α̃)〉 =
{
a1(p
1
0), as∗(p
2
0)
}
since the belief p10 is updated once in period 0 and in each period s = 1, . . . , s
∗, 〈ps(α̃)〉 =
{a1(p10), as−1(p20)} and as−1(p20) ≥ a1(p10). Thus, the strategy α̃ updates the belief as−1(p20) in
all periods s = 1, . . . , s∗. Since as∗(p
2
0) = p
1
0, we have
〈ps∗+1(α̃)〉 =
{
a1(p
1
0), p
1
0
}
= 〈ps∗+1(α∗)〉 .
Therefore, in each updating draw from the second set, 〈ps(α∗)〉 = 〈ps(α̃)〉 for all s ≥ s∗+ 1.
In particular, α∗ and α̃ stop in the same period, concluding the proof of the induction
step.
Proof of Proposition 7. Without loss of generality, we prove the statements for i = 1. We
claim that
D1ea(p) =

p−p1
2(p−p2)
(
1− (p−p
2)2
(p−p)
2
)
+ p
1−p2
p−p2 if p
1 ≥ p2,
p−p2
2(p−p1)
(
1− (p−p
1)2
(p−p)2
)
if p1 ≤ p2.
(16)
If p10 = p
2
0 = p, then α
∗ stops with beliefs (p1τ , p
2
τ ) = (p, p) (in which case the outside option
is chosen) with probability
(
p−p
p−p
)2
. By symmetry, for p10 = p
2
0, conditional on not choosing
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the outside option, the DM chooses item 1 with probability 1/2. Thus
D1ea(p, p) =
1
2
(
1−
(
p− p
p− p
)2)
. (17)
Now consider prior beliefs such that p10 > p
2
0. The strategy α
∗ initially focuses on item 1
until p1t = p or p
1
t = p
2
0. In the former case, which occurs with probability
p10−p20
p−p20
, the DM
chooses item 1. In the latter case, which occurs with probability
p−p10
p−p20
, the DM chooses item
1 with probability D1ea(p
2
0, p
2
0). Therefore, for p
1 > p2,
D1ea(p
1, p2) =
p1 − p2
p− p2
+
p− p1
p− p2
D1ea(p
2, p2),
which, together with (17), yields the expression in (16) for this case.
Finally, consider prior beliefs such that p10 < p
2
0. The strategy α
∗ initially focuses on
item 2 until p2t = p or p
2
t = p
1
0. In the former case, the DM chooses item 2. In the latter
case, which occurs with probability
p−p20
p−p10
, the DM chooses item 1 with probability D1ea(p
1
0, p
1
0).
Thus, for p1 < p2 we have
D1ea(p
1, p2) =
p− p2
p− p1
D1ea(p
1, p1),
which, together with (17), yields the expression in (16) for this case.
Statement 1 of the proposition follows from the fact that D1ea(p
1, p2) is convex in p1 and
strictly convex in p1 for [p, p2].
Substituting (16) into the definition of ei(p) gives, for p1 < p2,
e1(p; p) =
(1− 2λ)2(1− p1)2(p1)2(p− p2)
(p− p1)(pp1 − p+ λp1 − pλ(2p1 − 1))(p1 − pp1 − λp1 + pλ(2p1 − 1))
. (18)
Statement 4 of the proposition follows immediately from this expression. Statements 2
and 3 follow from the monotonicity of the right-hand side of (18) with respect to p2 and p1,
respectively. Monotonicity with respect to p2 is straightforward. For p1, one may verify that
∂2
∂p1∂p
log e1(p; p) < 0 for 0 < p1 < p < 1. Thus, it suffices to show that log e1(p; p) for p = 1
increases in p1. At p = 1, (18) simplifies to
e1(p; 1) =
(2λ− 1)2(p1)2(1− p2)
(1− λ)λ(1− p1)
,
which is indeed increasing in p1.
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Proof of Proposition 8. We use the same coupling construction as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4, again denoting by pt and p̂t the assessment sequences generated by strategies βl and
µl, respectively. Similarly, we denote variables generated with strategy βl by τ , k(j, t), etc.,
and variables generated by µl by τ̂ , k̂(j, t), etc.
For each item j and learning process πj, we say that πj reaches pjl if there exists κ
j
such that πj
κj
≥ pjl and pjl < π
j
κ for all κ < κ
j. Similarly, we say that πj reaches pj
l
if
there exists κj, such that πj
κj
≤ pj
l
and πjκ < p
j
l for all κ < κ
j. Let r be any element of
{p1
l
, p1l } × {p2l , p
2
l } × · · · × {pIl , p
I
l } and let rj ∈ {pjl , p
j
l } denote its j-th component. That is,
r is a vector that specifies for each item j an upper or lower threshold rj. We define for
each r a set Π(r) consisting of those learning draws π = (π1, . . . , πI) for which the process
πj reaches the threshold rj for each j. Note that the sets Π(r) are disjoint and their union
over all r has probability 1.
We distinguish three sets of vectors r. The first set, R1, consists of all r such that r
i = pi
l
for the target item i, and there exists j 6= i for which rj = pjl . Consider r ∈ R1 and any draw
π ∈ Π(r). Regardless of her attention strategy, the DM does not choose the target item i in
π (and instead chooses some j for which rj = pjl ).
The second set, R2, consists of all r such that r
i = pil for the target item i. Consider
r ∈ R2 and any draw π ∈ Π(r). We claim that if βl leads to the choice of the target item i in
draw π, then so does µl. The claim is immediate if π
j reaches pj
l
for each j 6= i; accordingly,
suppose that πj reaches pjl for some j 6= i. If, under βl, the DM chooses i in period τ , then
piτ ≥ pil (since it is not the case that the belief for each other item reaches its lower threshold).
Assume for contradiction that, under µl, the DM chooses j 6= i in some period τ̂ ≤ τ , and
hence p̂jτ̂ ≥ p
j
l . By the Attention Theorem, k(j, τ̂) ≥ k̂(j, τ̂) and thus p
j
τ ′ ≥ p
j
l for some
τ ′ ≤ τ̂ ≤ τ . Therefore, βl leads to the choice of j 6= i in period τ ′ ≤ τ , contradicting that
βl leads to the choice of i in period τ . Again by the Attention Theorem, k(i, τ) ≤ k̂(i, τ),
hence p̂iτ ≥ pil, and µl leads to the choice of i in period τ or earlier.
The third set, R3, is the singleton {(p1, . . . , pI)}. Consider r = (p1, . . . , pI) and a draw
π ∈ Π(r). We claim that if µl leads to the choice of the target item i in draw π, then so
does βl. If, under µl, the DM chooses i in period τ̂ , then p̂
j
τ̂ ≤ pjl for all j 6= i. Assume
for contradiction that, under βl, the DM chooses j
∗ 6= i in some period τ ≤ τ̂ , and hence
pjτ ≤ pjl for all j 6= j
∗. By the Attention Theorem, k(i, τ) ≤ k̂(i, τ) and thus p̂iτ̂ ′ ≤ pil for
some τ̂ ′ ≤ τ ≤ τ̂ . Non-wastefulness of µl together with the Coupling Lemma imply that
pτ = p̂τ , and thus µl leads to the choice of j
∗ in period τ ≤ τ̂ , contradicting that µl leads
to the choice of i in period τ̂ . Again by the Attention Theorem, k(i, τ̂) ≤ k̂(i, τ̂), which,
together with the Coupling Lemma, implies that pjτ̂ ≤ pjl for all j 6= i and hence βl leads to
the choice of i in period τ̂ or earlier.
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Observe that as l→∞, for any v such that vi = 1,
Pr
(
Π
(
p1
l
, . . . , pI
l
)
| v; pl
)
≤ Pr
(
ri = pi
l
| vi = 1
)
→ 0,
and for any v such that vi = 0,
Pr
( ⋃
r∈R2
Πl (r) | v; pl
)
≤ Pr
(
ri = pil | vi = 0
)
→ 0.
Therefore, for v such that vi = 1, lim inf l→∞
(
D̃i (v;µl, pl)− D̃i (v; βl, pl)
)
is nonnegative
since it has the same sign as
Pr
(
p̂τ̂ ∈ F ino (pl) |
⋃
r∈R2
Πl (r) ,v
)
− Pr
(
pτ ∈ F ino (pl) |
⋃
r∈R2
Πl (r) ,v
)
,
which is nonnegative for all l since for any draw in Πl (r) with r ∈ R2, pτ ∈ F ino (pl) implies
p̂τ̂ ∈ F ino (pl).
Similarly, for v such that vi = 0, the sign of lim supl→∞
(
D̃i (v;µl, pl)− D̃i (v; βl, pl)
)
is
the same as that of
Pr
(
p̂τ̂ ∈ F ino (pl) | Π
(
p1
l
, . . . , pI
l
)
,v
)
− Pr
(
pτ ∈ F ino (pl) | Π
(
p1
l
, . . . , pI
l
)
,v
)
.
which is nonpositive since for any draw in Π
(
p1
l
, . . . , pI
l
)
, p̂τ̂ ∈ F ino (pl) implies pτ ∈ F ino (pl).
B Counterexample: failure of stationarity
We show here that the conclusions of Proposition 4 can fail if the attention strategy satisfies
IIA but is non-stationary. Suppose there are three items and the DM is Bayesian with prior
beliefs pj0 = 1/2 for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The stopping thresholds p and p and the signal
structure for items 1 and 2 are the same as in the counterexample from Section 5.1. The
value of item 3 is perfectly revealed as soon as the DM focuses on it for a single period.
Let β be any non-stationary pure attention strategy that satisfies the following for p1 > p:
β(p, t) =

2 if t = 0,
3 if t = 1, p1 6= p10, and p3 > p,
1 otherwise.
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Under β, the DM first focuses on item 2, and then focuses on item 1 until p1 reaches p or
p. Hence, she chooses item 1 with probability 1/2. Let µ be the manipulated strategy that
focuses on item 1 in the first period and follows β thereafter. Under µ, the DM first focuses
on item 1, and then focuses on item 3—thereby learning its value—in the second period.
Thus, under µ, the DM chooses item 1 only if item 3 has value 0 and p1 reaches p, which
occurs with probability 1/4.
Proposition 4 does not apply for a reason akin to that in the counterexample from Section
5.1. The baseline and manipulated processes “meet” after two periods in that each focuses
on item 1 for exactly one of those periods. However, the beliefs about items 2 and 3 differ
between these two processes at t = 2, which causes the continuation of the processes to
differ. When IIAi and stationarity are satisfied, this cannot happen since, for each draw,
the accumulated focus k(i, t) on the target item i is a sufficient statistic for the distribution
of beliefs pt about all items in period t.
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